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The Conflict Between 
BlackRock’s Shareholder 
Activism and ERISA’s      
Fiduciary Duties 
Bernard S. Sharfman† 
Abstract 
The focus of this Article is on the agency costs that may be created 
by the empty voting of investment advisers to index funds and how 
they can be mitigated so as to protect the value of private employee 
pension benefit plans. This Article focuses on BlackRock because it has 
taken a leadership role in the leveraging of its delegated voting 
authority. Therefore, the issue I address in this Article is whether the 
fiduciary duties of a plan manager of an “employee pension benefit 
plan,” as authorized under the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), requires it to investigate BlackRock’s 
shareholder activism. This indirect approach is required as the fiduciary 
duties of ERISA do not generally extend to mutual funds and ETFs 
and their investment advisors. 
This Article takes the position that a plan manager has a fiduciary 
duty, the duty of prudence, to investigate BlackRock’s shareholder 
activism. This duty applies not only to BlackRock’s mutual funds or 
ETFs that an ERISA plan invests in but also to those BlackRock fund 
selections that it makes available to its participants and beneficiaries 
in self-directed accounts. 
 
†  Bernard S. Sharfman is a Senior Corporate Governance Fellow at the 
RealClearFoundation and a Research Fellow at the Law & Economics 
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opinions expressed here are the author’s alone and do not represent the 
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This Article is based on a white paper written for the RealClearFoundation, 
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(Case Western Reserve University School of Law). Mr. Sharfman would like 
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Given these fiduciary duties, this Article argues that if a plan man–
ager were to investigate BlackRock’s shareholder activism, especially 
its engagement strategy, it would likely find it to be in conflict with the 
manager’s fiduciary duties. Such a finding would require a plan manager 
to seek out other reasonably available alternatives that are not 
associated with such shareholder activism. 
While the focus of this Article is on BlackRock’s delegated voting 
authority and associated shareholder activism, it is meant to apply to 
any and all investment advisers who attempt to leverage their delegated 
voting authority for purposes of engaging in such activism. Moreover, 
the Department of Labor should provide guidance to plan managers on 
when the investment products of investment advisers with delegated 
voting authority need to be excluded. 
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Introduction 
The world is full of surprises. One of those surprises is that 
BlackRock, Inc. (“BlackRock”), an investment adviser1 that primarily 
markets and manages index funds to millions of passive investors 
around the globe, has become a leading shareholder activist. Based on 
the extremely large amount of assets it has under management, 
approximately $7.3 trillion with approximately $3.5 trillion of that 
being the common stock of publicly traded companies,2 its importance 
as an activist cannot be overstated. 
BlackRock and its major index-fund rivals Vanguard and State 
Street Global Advisors (the “Big Three”), have an enormous amount 
of proxy voting power. According to Bebchuk and Hirst, as of 2017 
BlackRock held in its managed portfolio a 5% or more position in 488 
out of the 500 common stocks that make up the S&P 500, Vanguard 
had such a position in all 500 companies, and State Street Global 
Advisors in 130.3 According to Fichtner, Heemskerk, and Garcia-
Bernardo, as of March 2016 BlackRock had a 5% or more position in 
about 2,000 out of the approximately 3,900 U.S. publicly listed 
companies then existing, Vanguard had such a position in 1,750 such 
companies, and State Street Global Advisors in 260 companies.4 
Yet this voting power actually understates the size of the Big 
Three’s voting influence; the reason being that they vote virtually all 
of the shares they manage while other investor types, such as retail 
investors, do not. For example, Brav, Cain, and Zytnick, over the time 
period 2015 to 2017, found that while retail investors held 
approximately 26% of the shares in their sample, they only cast a ballot 
32% of the time.5 This explains Bebchuk and Hirst’s findings that while 
 
1. 15 U.S.C. 80b–2(a)(11) (2018) (defining “Investment adviser” as a person 
who “engages in the business of advising others, either directly or through 
publications or writings, as to the value of securities or as to the 
advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities, or who, for 
compensation and as part of a regular business, issues or promulgates 
analyses or reports concerning securities . . . .”). 
2. BlackRock, Inc., Quarterly Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Form 10-Q) 46 (Aug. 7, 2020). 
3. Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, The Specter of the Giant Three, 99 B.U. 
L. Rev. 721, 735, tbl.4 (2019). 
4. Jan Fichtner, Eelke M. Heemskerk & Javier Garcia-Bernardo, Hidden 
Power of the Big Three? Passive Index Funds, Re-Concentration of 
Corporate Ownership, and New Financial Risk, 19 Bus. & Pol. 298, 311–
12 (2017). 
5. Alon Brav, Matthew D. Cain & Jonathon Zytnick, Retail Shareholder 
Participation in the Proxy Process: Monitoring, Engagement, and Voting, 
Harv. L. Sch. F. on Corp. Governance (Nov. 19, 2019), https://corp 
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on average the Big Three controlled 20.5% of shares of the companies 
that make up the S&P 500, they cast a combined 25.4% of the proxy 
votes.6 Bebchuk and Hirst also estimated that Vanguard had an average 
voting influence of 11.1%, BlackRock 8.7%, and State Street 5.6%.7 
Consistent with Bebchuk and Hirst, Caleb Griffin finds that while the 
Big Three control approximately 20.1% of shares at the largest 250 
publicly traded companies in the U.S., they cast a combined 25% of the 
proxy votes.8 He further estimated that Vanguard had an average 
voting influence of 10.6%, BlackRock 9.0%, and State Street 5.4%.9 
What has allowed the Big Three to become such large players in 
proxy voting? Basically, it is a combination of the strong investor 
interest in such index funds combined with how these funds have been 
traditionally managed. It begins when an individual investor or 
institution (beneficial investor) decides to invest in an index mutual 
fund or exchange traded fund (“ETF”) that predominately invests in 
equity securities—for example, a fund that invests in equities that make 
up the S&P 500. This decision usually means that the beneficial 
investor is delegating its shareholder voting to the index fund, a 
common industry practice which relieves the beneficial investor of 
having to worry about shareholder voting. And the delegation of voting 
authority does not stop there. The mutual fund or ETF will then turn 
around and delegate its voting authority to the fund’s investment 
adviser, the adviser that is responsible for managing the fund’s portfolio 
of investments. 
These standard practices, combined with the large movement of 
assets into the index funds of a relatively small number of investment 
advisers, has resulted in a concentration of voting power. But what is 
most striking about this arrangement is that the investment advisers to 
the funds have no economic interest in the underlying securities. This 
“decoupling” or “unbundling” of voting interests from economic 




6. Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 3, at 736, tbl.5. 
7. Id. 
8. Caleb N. Griffin, Margins: Estimating the Influence of the Big Three on 
Shareholder Proposals, 73 SMU L. Rev. 409, 418 tbl.1 (2020). 
9. Id. While it is beyond the scope of this Article, it should be noted that 
the voting power and influence of a Big Three member would be amplified 
if two or more of the Big Three had similar marketing and engagement 
strategies. In sum, an uncoordinated wolf pack would be created. 
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voting.”10—here, the empty voting of investment advisers to index 
mutual funds and ETFs.11 
Empty voting creates a potential misalignment between the 
interests of voters (investment advisers to index mutual funds and 
ETFs) and the residual risk bearers (beneficial investors that own 
shares in the index mutual funds and ETFs) and therefore creates the 
potential for agency costs12—more precisely, what Gilson and Gordon 
would call “the agency costs of agency capitalism.”13 In the case of 
investment advisers to index funds, these agency costs come in two 
flavors. The first are “passive” agency costs.14 These costs refer to the 
economic disincentives investment advisers to index funds have in 
becoming informed about the investments they manage, including when 
they vote their proxies.15 The second are “proactive” agency costs.16 
These costs refer to the economic incentives investment advisers have 
to leverage their delegated voting authority for their own gain.17 
Moreover, BlackRock, like the other members of the Big Three, has 
centralized this enormous voting authority and influence into the hands 
of a small group of individuals, its investment stewardship team. This 
allows BlackRock to aggregate shareholder voting across a myriad of 
funds for purposes of taking advantage of economies of scale and cost 
 
10. Henry T. C. Hu, Financial Innovation and Governance Mechanisms: The 
Evolution of Decoupling and Transparency, 70 Bus. Law. 347, 355 (2015). 
11. See Bernard S. Sharfman, Mutual Fund Advisors’ “Empty Voting” Raises 




12. See Jill E. Fisch, Securities Intermediaries and the Separation of Ownership 
from Control, 33 Seattle U. L. Rev. 877, 884 (2010) (“The existence of 
additional agency costs within the intermediary structure offers reason to 
question the proposition that institutional investors can improve corporate 
decision-making by more active participation in corporate governance.”). 
13. Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency 
Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 
113 Colum. L. Rev. 863, 889 (2013). 
14. Bernard S. Sharfman, How the SEC Can Help Mitigate the “Proactive” 
Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism, 8 Am. U. Bus. L. Rev. 1, 4 (2019). 
15. See Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of 
Corporate Governance: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 119 Colum. L. Rev. 
2029, 2039 (2019); Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Scott Hirst, The 
Agency Problems of Institutional Investors, 31 J. Econ. Persps. 89, 95 
(2017); Gilson & Gordon, supra note 13, at 889–95. 
16. Sharfman, supra note 14, at 3. 
17. Id. 
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minimization. Its team is made up of forty-five professionals globally, 
with twenty-two based in the U.S. (twelve are global, and ten are local), 
who are, on an annual basis, responsible for the voting of tens of 
thousands of proxies and engaging on various matters with the 
management of hundreds of publicly traded companies.18 Therefore, at 
many public companies, BlackRock’s investment stewardship team, like 
its chief rivals, “may now control the fate of a shareholder or 
management proposal, whether a nominated director receives a required 
majority of votes to remain on the board of directors, or if a proxy 
contest succeeds or fails.”19 
BlackRock’s creation of an investment stewardship team also allows 
it to coordinate its shareholder activism based not only on popular 
corporate governance principles but also on its own company objectives. 
This activism is reflected in its rhetoric disclosing the objectives of its 
activism and the engagement strategy that it intends to use to achieve 
its objectives, shareholder voting, and engagement with portfolio 
companies. As subsequently discussed, such activism contains elements 
of both passive and proactive agency costs that may be harmful to both 
beneficial investors and public companies. 
The focus of this Article is on the agency costs that may be created 
by the empty voting of investment advisers to index funds and how 
they can be mitigated so as to protect the value of private employee 
pension benefit plans. This Article focuses on BlackRock because it has 
taken a leadership role in the leveraging of its delegated voting 
authority. Therefore, the issue I address in this Article is whether the 
fiduciary duties of a plan manager of an “employee pension benefit 
plan,” as authorized under the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act of 1974 (“ERISA”),20 requires it to investigate BlackRock’s 
shareholder activism. This indirect approach is required as the fiduciary 
duties of ERISA do not generally extend to mutual funds and ETFs 
and their investment advisors. 
A plan manager (trustees who retain investment and voting 
authority or “investment managers”21 that receive such authority 
through delegation by the trustees) of an “employee pension benefit 
 
18. Investment Stewardship Annual Report, BlackRock 25, 68 (Sept. 2020), 
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/publication/blk-annual 
-stewardship-report-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/XE6U-4S2V]. 
19. Sharfman, supra note 14, at 13. 
20. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 
88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (2012)). 
21. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(38). 
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plan”22 owes a duty of loyalty23 to participants24 and beneficiaries.25 A 
plan manager also has a duty of prudence.26 This latter duty requires a 
plan manager to perform a careful and impartial investigation prior to 
making an investment decision. How these duties affect a plan 
manager’s evaluation of an investment adviser’s shareholder activism 
has been little examined in the academic literature. Yet the time is ripe 
for its study because the shareholder voting power of our public 
companies is now so concentrated in the hands of a small number of 
investment advisers. 
This Article takes the position that a plan manager’s fiduciary 
duties require it to investigate BlackRock’s shareholder activism. These 
duties apply not only to the BlackRock mutual funds or ETFs that an 
ERISA plan invests in, but also to those BlackRock fund selections that 
it makes available to its participants and beneficiaries in self-directed 
accounts. This Article also argues that a plan manager, after investi–
gating BlackRock’s engagement strategy, could reasonably conclude 
that it is financially harmful to its plan and decide to seek out 
“reasonably available alternatives” 27 that are not associated with such 
an engagement strategy. 
Part I of this Article discusses BlackRock’s rhetoric and how it has 
been used to disclose the company’s primary objective in its shareholder 
activism—the marketing of its investment products to millennials—and 
 
22. See id. § 1002(2)(A) (“[T]he terms ‘employee pension benefit plan’ and 
‘pension plan’ mean any plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or 
is hereafter established or maintained by an employer or by an employee 
organization, or by both, to the extent that by its express terms or as a 
result of surrounding circumstances such plan, fund, or program—(i) 
provides retirement income to employees, or (ii) results in a deferral of 
income by employees for periods extending to the termination of covered 
employment or beyond . . . .”). 
23. See id. § 1104(a)(1) (explaining that a fiduciary must “discharge his duties 
with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and 
beneficiaries”).  
24. See id. § 1002(7) (“The term ‘participant’ means any employee or former 
employee of an employer, or any member or former member of an 
employee organization, who is or may become eligible to receive a benefit 
of any type from an employee benefit plan which covers employees of such 
employer or members of such organization, or whose beneficiaries may be 
eligible to receive any such benefit.”). 
25. See id. § 1002(8) (“The term ‘beneficiary’ means a person designated by 
a participant, or by the terms of an employee benefit plan, who is or may 
become entitled to a benefit thereunder”). 
26. See id. § 1104(a)(1)(B); ERISA, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 404(a)(1)(B), 88 
Stat. 829, 877. 
27. Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments, 85 Fed. Reg. 72,846, 
72,848 (Nov. 13, 2020) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 2509 and 2550). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 4·2021 
The Conflict Between BlackRock’s Shareholder Activism and           
ERISA’s Fiduciary Duties 
1248 
how it plans to engage with its portfolio companies. Part II describes 
BlackRock’s voting and engagement record. Part III explains the 
fiduciary duties of ERISA. Part IV discusses how ERISA’s fiduciary 
duties are to be applied to BlackRock’s index funds. This Part proposes 
a new rule under ERISA: A plan manager, when selecting [index] 
mutual funds and ETFs for direct ownership or availability to self-
directed accounts and in the general monitoring of plan’s ongoing 
investment in these funds, has a fiduciary duty to investigate an 
investment adviser’s [BlackRock’s] shareholder activism. Part V applies 
this new rule to BlackRock’s shareholder activism. 
While the focus of this paper is on BlackRock’s delegated voting 
authority and associated shareholder activism, it is meant to apply to 
any and all investment advisers who attempt to leverage their delegated 
voting authority for purposes of engaging in shareholder activism. 
Moreover, the Department of Labor (“DOL”) should provide guidance 
to plan managers on when the investment products of investment 
advisers with delegated voting authority need to be excluded. 
I. BlackRock’s Rhetoric 
Through its rhetoric BlackRock has revealed: 1) its primary 
objective: the marketing of its investment products to millennials; 
2) how that objective is going to impact its engagement strategy: a 
focus on advocating for stakeholders that millennials believe are most 
deserving; and 3) how shareholder voting will be used to persuade 
portfolio companies that its advocacy needs to be implemented: voting 
against management when management does not comply. 
A. A Focus on Stakeholders 
For some time, Larry Fink (CEO of BlackRock) has been signaling 
to the management of public companies and BlackRock’s competitors—
Vanguard, State Street Global Advisors, Fidelity, etc.—that BlackRock 
was going to use its huge amount of delegated voting authority to 
become one of the world’s largest shareholder activists, advocating for 
all stakeholders, not just shareholders. These stakeholders include 
shareholders, directors, managers, employees, independent contractors, 
consultants, consumers, creditors, vendors, distributors, communities 
affected by the company’s operations, federal, state, and local 
governments, and society in general, when it is positively affected by 
the social value created by the company or negatively affected when 
the company generates third-party costs such as air or water pollution. 
In Fink’s 2018 letter to CEOs, he set the stage for his stakeholder 
approach: 
We also see many governments failing to prepare for the future, 
on issues ranging from retirement and infrastructure to auto–
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mation and worker retraining. As a result, society increasingly is 
turning to the private sector and asking that companies respond 
to broader societal challenges. Indeed, the public expectations of 
your company have never been greater. Society is demanding that 
companies, both public and private, serve a social purpose. To 
prosper over time, every company must not only deliver financial 
performance, but also show how it makes a positive contribution 
to society. Companies must benefit all of their stakeholders, 
including shareholders, employees, customers, and the commun–
ities in which they operate.28 
In this context, “social purpose” seems to mean something much 
different than simply having the purpose of producing those goods and 
services that consumers or other companies value. Fink also wants to 
focus on the interests of all stakeholders, not just shareholders. The 
reason for the latter was not explained until Fink’s 2019 letter to CEOs. 
B. The Primary Objective: Marketing BlackRock’s 
Investment Products to Millennials 
In Fink’s 2019 letter to CEOs, he explained what BlackRock’s new 
focus on “social purpose” and “benefiting all stakeholders” was all 
about: the marketing of its investment products to millennials, a 
demographic group that is expected to inherit trillions of dollars of 
wealth from its baby boomer parents.29 
 
28. Larry Fink, Larry Fink’s 2018 Letter to CEOs: A Sense of Purpose, 
BlackRock, https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/20 
18-larry-fink-ceo-letter [https://perma.cc/PU37-ZE8C] (emphases added) 
(last visited Apr. 6, 2021). 
29. It can be argued that marketing to millennials is not BlackRock’s only 
objective. Secondary objectives include BlackRock using its shareholder 
activism to appease its own shareholders who are upset with BlackRock’s 
management practices. For example, in 2019, Boston Trust Walden and 
Mercy Investment Services submitted a shareholder proposal to BlackRock 
demanding that it provide a review explaining why its climate-change 
rhetoric does not correspond with how it actually votes at shareholder 
meetings. See BlackRock, Vanguard Face Shareholder Rebuke over Climate 
Votes, Pensions & Invs. (Dec. 13, 2019), https://www.pionline.com 
/governance/blackrock-vanguard-face-shareholder-rebuke-over-climate-vot 
es [https://perma.cc/7WMC-LEGR]. The proposal was reportedly with–
drawn after BlackRock agreed to give increased consideration to shareholder 
proposals on climate change and join Climate Action 100+, an investor 
group that targets its shareholder activism at fossil fuel producers and 
greenhouse gas emitters. Blackrock and JP Morgan Spared ESG Voting 
Proposals Following Sustainability Pushes, Responsible Inv. (Mar. 10, 
2020), https://www.bostontrustwalden.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/ 
Blackrock-and-JP-Morgan-spared-ESG-voting-proposals-following-sustain 
ability-pushes_.pdf [https://perma.cc/E3D3-NRQT]. Or, non-shareholder 
activists who have a belief that BlackRock is creating harm. For example, 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 4·2021 
The Conflict Between BlackRock’s Shareholder Activism and           
ERISA’s Fiduciary Duties 
1250 
According to BlackRock, millennials, more so than prior gener–
ations, see the primary objective of business to be the improvement of 
society, not the generation of profits:30 
Companies that fulfill their purpose and responsibilities to stake–
holders reap rewards over the long-term. Companies that ignore 
them stumble and fail. This dynamic is becoming increasingly 
apparent as the public holds companies to more exacting 
standards. And it will continue to accelerate as millennials—who 
today represent 35 percent of the workforce—express new 
expectations of the companies they work for, buy from, and invest 
in. 
. . . Over the past year, we have seen some of the world’s most 
skilled employees stage walkouts and participate in contentious 
town halls, expressing their perspective on the importance of 
corporate purpose. This phenomenon will only grow as millennials 
and even younger generations occupy increasingly senior positions 
in business. In a recent survey by Deloitte, millennial workers 
were asked what the primary purpose of businesses should be—
63 percent more of them said “improving society” than said 
“generating profit.” 
In the years to come, the sentiments of these generations will 
drive not only their decisions as employees but also as investors,  
there is an organization called BlackRock’s Big Problem, which is a 
worldwide group of NGOs and “financial advocates that are pressuring asset 
managers like BlackRock” to adjust their climate practices. About, 
BlackRock’s Big Problem, https://www.blackrocksbigproblem.com/ 
about [https://perma.cc/WJG7-CUZH] (last visited Apr. 6, 2021). Finally, 
BlackRock can use its shareholder activism to mitigate political pressure. 
For example, five U.S. senators recently sent a letter to BlackRock 
criticizing how it votes on shareholder proposals involving climate change 
and political spending disclosures. While it is beyond the scope of this 
Article to explore further, buckling under this pressure would appear to 
violate the fiduciary duties BlackRock owes to its mutual funds and ETFs 
and their beneficial investors. See Letter from Brian Schatz, U.S. Sen., 
Sheldon Whitehouse, U.S. Sen., Tammy Baldwin, U.S. Sen., Elizabeth 
Warren, U.S. Sen. & Martin Heinrich, U.S. Sen., to Larry Fink, CEO of 
Blackrock (Oct. 8, 2020), https://www.schatz.senate.gov/imo/media/ 
doc/Letter%20to%20BlackRock%20on%202020%20proxy%20voting%20rec
ord_2020.10.08.pdf [https://perma.cc/HG25-NXDX]. 
30. Larry Fink, Larry Fink’s 2019 Letter to CEOs: Purpose & Profit, 
BlackRock, https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/20 
19-larry-fink-ceo-letter [https://perma.cc/T2ZV-H7YJ] (last visited Mar. 
27, 2021). This letter was apparently the inspiration for Michal Barzuza, 
Quinn Curtis, and David H. Webber’s recent article, Shareholder Value(s): 
Index Fund ESG Activism and the New Millennial Corporate Governance, 
93 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1243, 1246 (2020). 
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with the world undergoing the largest transfer of wealth in 
history: $24 trillion from baby boomers to millennials. As wealth 
shifts and investing preferences change, environmental, social, 
and governance issues [ESG] will be increasingly material to 
corporate valuations. This is one of the reasons why BlackRock 
devotes considerable resources to improving the data and 
analytics for measuring these factors, integrates them across our 
entire investment platform, and engages with the companies in 
which we invest on behalf of our clients to better understand your 
approach to them.31 
BlackRock’s focus on millennials appears to make good business 
sense. Millennials will increasingly be the ones holding most of the 
wealth in the U.S., making it essential for firms to start catering to 
their needs and developing brand loyalty now, not later.32 In sum, by 
focusing on millennials now, it appears that BlackRock hopes to 
maintain or perhaps even expand its future market share of “assets 
under management” (AUM).33 
Consistent with its millennial objective, Fink announced in his 2020 
letter to clients the launch of a large number of new ESG funds.34 Such 
offerings appear to be an attempt to capitalize on the notion that 
millennials believe they can do good through “stock-picking.” While 
there is no evidence to suggest that such good can result from such an 
activity,35 the successful marketing of such funds can do a lot to enhance 
the profitability of BlackRock, as these funds will be able to charge 
higher fees. 
 
31. Fink, Larry Fink’s 2019 Letter to CEOs, supra note 30 (emphases added). 
32. Barzuza, Curtis & Webber, supra note 30, at 1286. 
33. Id. at 1249–50. 
34. Larry Fink, Larry Fink’s 2020 Letter to Clients: Sustainability as 
BlackRock’s New Standard for Investing, BlackRock, https://www. 
blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/2020-blackrock-client-letter 
[https://perma.cc/D35A-B5ER] (last visited Mar. 27, 2021). 
35. According to Professor Alicia Munnell: 
That’s preposterous to me that you have big social problems like 
that [(gender equality or the prevention of global warming)], and 
you think they can be solved by stock-picking . . . . And it’s really 
kind of dangerous in some ways, because it makes people feel like 
they’re doing something good to actually solve global warming, 
and it’s really not. 
 Patrick Donachie, A Blue Wave May Derail DOL’s Rule on ESG in 
Retirement Plans, WealthManagement.com (Oct. 28, 2020), https:// 
www.wealthmanagement.com/regulation-compliance/blue-wave-may-der 
ail-dols-rule-esg-retirement-plans [https://perma.cc/5JQT-R33Q]. 
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For example, because of the portfolio screening services that an 
index provides,36 mutual funds and ETFs that track the MSCI’s KLD 
400 Social Index, such as BlackRock’s iShares MSCI KLD 400 Social 
ETF,37 will typically charge significantly higher fees than funds and 
ETFs that track the more standardized and broadly based CRSP U.S. 
Total Market Index38 or Fidelity U.S. Total Investable Market Index.39 
In sum, the offering of ESG funds that yield greater profit margins is 
another expected benefit of its millennial objective. 
C. BlackRock’s Engagement Strategy 
In Fink’s 2020 letters to CEOs40 and clients,41 BlackRock explained 
the parameters of its engagement strategy and how it would help 
achieve its primary objective. First, BlackRock will be dictating its own 
vision of what a public company’s (a company traded on a U.S. stock 
exchange or over-the-counter) stakeholder relationships should be by 
requiring its portfolio companies (virtually every public company) to 
disclose data on “how each company serves its full set of stakeholders.”42 
Moreover, noncompliance is not acceptable. According to Fink, “we will 
be increasingly disposed to vote against management and board 
directors when companies are not making sufficient progress on 
sustainability-related disclosures and the business practices and plans 
underlying them.”43 
 
36. For a discussion of portfolio screening for purposes of creating an ESG 
index fund, see Bernard S. Sharfman, ESG Investing Under ERISA, 38 
Yale J. on Reg. Bull. 112, 120–21 (2020). 
37. iShares MSCI KLD 400 Social ETF Fact Sheet, BlackRock (Mar. 31, 
2020), https://www.ishares.com/us/literature/fact-sheet/dsi-ishares-msci 
-kld-400-social-etf-fund-fact-sheet-en-us.pdf [https://perma.cc/SNN2-VG 
QP] (identifying an expense ratio of 0.25%). 
38. Vanguard Total Stock Market ETF, Vanguard, https://investor.van 
guard.com/etf/profile/fees/vti [https://perma.cc/F428-H7EY] (last visited 
Mar. 27, 2021) (identifying an expense ratio of 0.03%). 
39. Fidelity’s ZEROSM Total Market Index Fund, Fidelity Invs. (Jul. 3, 
2020), https://fundresearch.fidelity.com/mutual-funds/fundfactsheet/316 
35T708 [https://perma.cc/S6H7-CNHD] (identifying an expense ratio of 
0.00%). 
40. Larry Fink, Larry Fink’s 2020 Letter to CEOs: A Fundamental Reshaping 
of Finance, BlackRock, https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-
relations/2020-larry-fink-ceo-letter [https://perma.cc/WN4U-G47E] (last 
visited Mar. 27, 2021). 
41. Fink, Larry Fink’s 2020 Letter to Clients, supra note 34. 
42. Fink, Larry Fink’s 2020 Letter to CEOs, supra note 40. 
43. Id. (emphasis added). 
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These stakeholders include not only those stakeholders impacted by 
climate change44 but also those who suffer from a lack of gender 
equality.45 Moreover, BlackRock has recently signaled that increased 
attention will be given to those stakeholders impacted by COVID-19 
and Black Lives Matter46: 
We have learned from our engagements that companies are 
finding it challenging to balance the short-term actions needed to 
mitigate the professional and personal effects of COVID-19 on 
their employees, customers, and other stakeholders. Companies 
are having to transition their business models to allow employees 
to work from home or in a safe, socially distanced environment. 
This transition also includes companies re-designing their supply 
chains and operations due to impacts caused by COVID-19. 
BIS [(BlackRock Investment stewardship team)] remains focused 
on companies’ progress with respect to diversity. The movement 
for racial equity and justice underscores the need for companies 
to do better to ensure representation at all levels of the workforce, 
alongside an inclusive culture in which a diverse workforce can 
employ skills and expertise to full effect in driving a company’s 
strategic objectives and long-term shareholder value.47 
This engagement strategy, targeting for advocacy those stake–
holders who have the most appeal to millennials, is arguably a way for 
BlackRock to show millennials that they have shared values. As a 
result, this should encourage millennials to invest in the index funds 
that BlackRock manages. 
II. Putting Words into Action: BlackRock’s Voting 
and Engagement Record 
Besides its rhetoric, BlackRock’s shareholder activism is made up 
of shareholder voting and engagement (direct or indirect commun–
ication) with the management of portfolio companies. Voting and 
engagement are intertwined activities, with voting being the stick that 
BlackRock can use to pressure companies to adopt their stakeholder 
 
44. Id. 
45. Fink, Larry Fink’s 2020 Letter to Clients, supra note 34. 
46. BlackRock Investment Stewardship Global Quarterly Stewardship Report 
July 2020, BlackRock 1, 4, https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/liter 
ature/publication/blk-qrtly-stewardship-report-q2-2020.pdf [https://per 
ma.cc/ES6N-778C]. 
47. Id. at 3. 
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policies. Based on its second-quarter 2020 Global Quarterly Stewardship 
Report (the “Report”),48 it is now clear that BlackRock’s investment 
stewardship team has ramped up its shareholder activism. On a global 
basis, again utilizing only around forty-five professionals, the team 
accomplished the following in the second quarter of 2020: 
• Voting: Globally, “voted at more than 9,200 shareholder 
meetings [(9,540 meetings)] on more than 100,000 proposals 
[(103,169)]. . . . [v]oted against at least one management 
proposal at 43% of shareholder meetings globally and against 
management’s recommendation on 9% of all proposals.”49 
Specific to North America, BlackRock voted at 3,085 
shareholder meetings, voted on 27,126 proposals, voted against 
at least one management proposal at 30% of the meetings, and 
voted against management’s recommendation on 7% of all 
proposals.50 Moreover, as what appears to be the primary way 
of enforcing their engagement objectives, they voted against 
board-nominated directors approximately 9% of the time 
(1,751 votes against out of 19,459 total votes).51 
• Engagement: Globally, “a 22% increase in total company 
engagements [(974)] compared to Q2 2019. [The team] engaged 
in direct dialogue with 812 companies, interacting multiple 
times with 13% of them.”52 These engagements were divided 
into three themes: governance, environmental, and social.53 
Under the governance theme, the top engagement topics were 
board composition and effectiveness (discussed 504 times), 
corporate strategy (“long-term strategic direction, how 
strategy, purpose and culture are aligned, and corporate 
milestones against which to assess management” discussed 383 
times), and executive compensation (discussed 379 times).54 
Under the environmental theme, the top engagement topics 
were climate risk management (discussed 272 times) and 
operational sustainability (“waste and water management, 
 
48. Id. at 1. 
49. Id. at 4 (emphasis added). 
50. Id. at 6. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. at 4. 
53. Id. at 5. 
54. Id.  
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packaging, product life-cycle management, product offerings, 
and energy efficiency” discussed 245 times).55 
Under the social theme, the top engagement topics were 
human capital management (discussed 236 times; a threefold 
rise).56 
• Voting and Engagement: “[I]dentified 244 companies” that 
it believed were “making insufficient progress integrating 
climate risk into their business models or disclosures.”57 “Of 
these companies, [it] took voting action against 53, or 22% 
and . . . put the remaining 191 companies ‘on watch.’”58 
“Those companies that do not make significant progress” on 
“integrating climate risk into their business models or 
disclosures” “risk voting action against management in 
2021.”59 In addition, when it came to shareholder proposals on 
the environment, out of 30 votes, they voted with shareholders 
20% of the time.60 
III. ERISA’s Fiduciary Duties 
What does the law have to say about BlackRock’s shareholder 
activism? For purposes of this Article, the law is ERISA and its 
fiduciary duties. Justice Stephen Breyer, in his opinion in Varity Corp. 
v. Howe, begins this Article’s explanation of ERISA’s fiduciary duties: 
ERISA protects employee pensions and other benefits by 
providing insurance (for vested pension rights, see ERISA § 4001 
et seq.), specifying certain plan characteristics in detail (such as 
when and how pensions vest, see §§ 201–211), and by setting forth 
certain general fiduciary duties applicable to the management of 
both pension and nonpension benefit plans. . . . 
In doing so, we recognize that these fiduciary duties draw much 
of their content from the common law of trusts, the law that 
governed most benefit plans before ERISA’s enactment.  
We also recognize, however, that trust law does not tell the entire 
story. After all, ERISA’s standards and procedural protections 
 
55. Id. 
56. Id. at 4–5. 
57. Id. (emphasis added). 
58. Id. 
59. Id. (emphasis added). 
60. Id. at 7. 
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partly reflect a congressional determination that the common law 
of trusts did not offer completely satisfactory protection. And, 
even with respect to the trust-like fiduciary standards ERISA 
imposes, Congress “expect[ed] that the courts will interpret this 
prudent man rule (and the other fiduciary standards) bearing in 
mind the special nature and purpose of employee benefit plans,” 
as they “develop a ‘federal common law of rights and obligations 
under ERISA-regulated plans.’”61 
Given that fiduciary framework, this Article seeks a fact pattern 
where the fiduciary duties of ERISA require a plan manager to 
investigate BlackRock’s shareholder activism. Please note that this 
Article is not talking about the fiduciary duties of BlackRock under 
ERISA. In general, as an investment adviser to mutual funds and ETFs, 
it has none unless it directly manages all or part of a plan.62 Therefore, 
this Article is focused on how the fiduciary duties of a plan manager 
interacts with BlackRock’s shareholder activism. 
A. Duty of Loyalty 
ERISA Section 3(21)(A) provides that a “person is a fiduciary with 
respect to a plan to the extent (i) he exercises any discretionary 
authority or discretionary control respecting management of such plan 
or exercises any authority or control respecting management or 
 
61. 516 U.S. 489, 496–97 (1996) (citations omitted). 
62. ERISA § 3(21)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(B), provides: 
If any money or other property of an employee benefit plan is 
invested in securities issued by an investment company registered 
under the Investment Company Act of 1940 [15 U.S.C. 80a–1 et 
seq.], such investment shall not by itself cause such investment 
company or such investment company’s investment adviser or 
principal underwriter to be deemed to be a fiduciary or a party in 
interest as those terms are defined in this title, except insofar as 
such investment company or its investment adviser or principal 
underwriter acts in connection with an employee benefit plan 
covering employees of the investment company, the investment 
adviser, or its principal underwriter. Nothing contained in this 
subparagraph shall limit the duties imposed on such investment 
company, investment adviser, or principal underwriter by any 
other law. 
 See also Fiduciary Duties Regarding Proxy Voting and Shareholder 
Rights, 85 Fed. Reg. 55,219, 55,234 (proposed Sept. 4, 2020) (to be 
codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2509, 2550) (“ERISA does not govern the 
management of the portfolio internal to a fund registered with the SEC, 
including such fund’s exercise of its shareholder rights appurtenant to the 
portfolio of stocks it holds. . . .”). 
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disposition of its assets.”63 Fiduciaries include trustees64 who retain 
management control over plan assets and investment managers65 who, 
because of their financial expertise, are commonly delegated such 
authority by the trustees (“plan managers”). These fiduciaries must go 
about their work under the guidance of very strict fiduciary duties of 
loyalty and care.66 
Under ERISA’s duty of loyalty, a plan manager shall discharge his 
duties with respect to a plan “‘solely in the interest of the participants 
and beneficiaries and for the exclusive purpose of’ benefitting them.”67 
This “sole interest rule” is a codification of what is found in the common 
law of trusts.68 It creates a very specific and narrow path for a plan 
manager when considering an investment strategy or providing mutual-
fund or ETF selections for self-directed individual accounts. 
According to the Restatement (Third) of Trusts, “the trustee [plan 
manager] has a duty to the beneficiaries [and participants] not to be 
influenced by the interest of any third person or by motives other than 
the accomplishment of the purposes of the trust [ERISA plan].”69 
Moreover, a “trustee [plan manager] who is influenced by his own or a 
third party’s interests is disloyal, because the trustee [plan manager] is 
no longer acting solely in the interest of the beneficiaries.”70 
In addition, based on the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
the statutory language, the fiduciary must act on behalf of the plan for 
the “exclusive purpose” of: 
“providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries” while 
“defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan.” Read 
in the context of ERISA as a whole, the term “benefits” in the 
provision just quoted must be understood to refer to the sort of 
financial benefits (such as retirement income) that trustees who 
manage investments typically seek to secure for the trust’s 
beneficiaries. Cf. § 1002(2)(A) (defining “employee pension 
 
63. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A). 
64. See id. § 1105(c)(3). 
65. See id. § 1102(c)(3). 
66. Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Cent. Transp., Inc., 472 
U.S. 559, 570–71 (1985). 
67. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A)(i) (emphasis added). 
68. Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Reconciling Fiduciary Duty 
and Social Conscience: The Law and Economics of ESG Investing by a 
Trustee, 72 Stan. L. Rev. 381, 403 (2020). 
69. Id. at 400 (citing Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 78(1) cmt. f. (Am. 
L. Inst. 2007)). 
70. Id. at 401 (emphasis added). 
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benefit plan” and “pension plan” to mean plans that provide em–
ployees with “retirement income” or other “deferral of income”).71 
The Court provided further that “[t]he term [‘benefits’] does not 
cover nonpecuniary benefits” such as promoting the goal of employee 
ownership of company stock.72 Therefore, ERISA’s fiduciary duties 
incorporate a mandatory “common investor purpose,”73 the pursuit of 
financial benefits for the plan beneficiaries, that does not allow for the 
pursuit of nonfinancial or nonmonetary benefits even if participants and 
beneficiaries approve. In sum, plan managers are to be constantly 
guided by the fiduciary principles of acting “solely in the interest of the 
participants and beneficiaries” and for the exclusive purpose of 
providing financial benefits to them. 
This fiduciary duty of loyalty is very strict and narrowly confided 
to making sure that participants and beneficiaries receive the retirement 
benefits that they are entitled to, period. The reason for this is 
Congressional intent. Congress was obsessed with the financial 
corruption in private pension plans during the 50s and 60s and wanted 
to make sure a repeat did not occur.74 This corruption included the 
widespread looting of union-controlled employee retirement plans.75 
B. Duty of Prudence 
Under ERISA, the duty of prudence requires that a plan manager 
act “with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circum–
stances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity 
and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise 
of a like character and with like aims.”76 Thus, a prudent person 
standard applies. 
 
71. Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. 409, 420–21 (2014) (quoting 
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A)(i)–(ii)). Such an understanding of “exclusive 
purpose” makes it extremely difficult to accept David Webber’s argument 
that it is permissible to use the funds of ERISA plans for purposes of 
creating jobs for plan participants. See David H. Webber, The Use and 
Abuse of Labor’s Capital, 89 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 2106, 2126–27 (2014). 
72. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. at 421. 
73. Sean J. Griffith, Opt-In Stewardship: Toward an Optimal Delegation of 
Mutual Fund Voting Authority, 98 Tex. L. Rev. 983, 990 (2020). 
74. See Daniel R. Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA’s Fundamental 
Contradiction: The Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1105, 1110 
(1988). 
75. Id. 
76. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B); ERISA, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 404(a)(1)(B), 
88 Stat. 829, 877. 
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This standard certainly applies when a plan manager selects its 
investments.77 Moreover, critical to determining whether a plan 
manager has met its duty of prudence is a finding that the fiduciary 
has acted independently78 and impartially79 when making its investment 
decisions. As a result, “[t]he duty of prudence prevents a fiduciary from 
choosing an investment alternative that is financially less beneficial 
than reasonably available alternatives.”80 
C. ERISA’s Duties and Shareholder Voting/Engagement 
As I have previously written on this subject: 
[S]ince 1988, when first presented in a formal Opinion Letter now 
commonly referred to as the “Avon Letter,” it has been DOL 
policy that the fiduciary act of managing plan assets also includes 
managing the voting rights associated with a plan’s equity 
holdings.81  
In the Avon Letter, the Pension and Welfare Benefits Admin–
istration, the DOL department that preceded the Employee 
Benefits Security Administration in the administration of 
ERISA,82 stated that “[i]n general, the fiduciary act of managing 
 
77. Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455, 1467 (5th Cir. 1983) (“In addition, 
the prudent man rule as codified in ERISA is a flexible standard: the 
adequacy of a fiduciary’s investigation is to be evaluated in light of the 
‘character and aims’ of the particular type of plan he serves.”) (citing 29 
U.S.C. § 1104(a)(I)(B)). 
78. Fink v. Nat’l Sav. & Tr. Co., 772 F.2d 951, 957 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“A 
fiduciary’s independent investigation of the merits of a particular invest–
ment is at the heart of the prudent person standard.”). 
79. Craig C. Martin, Michael A. Doornweerd, Amanda S. Amert & 
Douglas A. Sondgeroth, Jenner & Block Practice Series: ERISA 
Litigation Handbook (2012) (quoting Bussian v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 223 
F.3d 286, 302 (5th Cir. 2000) and citing Flanigan v. Gen. Elec. Co., 242 
F.3d 78, 86 (2d Cir. 2001)) (explaining that the duty of prudence requires 
a plan manager to conduct a “thorough, impartial investigation”). 
80. Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments, 85 Fed. Reg. 72,846, 72,848 
(Nov. 13, 2020) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2509, 2550) (emphasis 
added). 
81. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Pension & Welfare Benefit Admin., Opinion Letter on 
Avon Products, Inc. Employees’ Retirement Plan at *2 (Feb. 23, 1988) 
[hereinafter Avon Letter]. 
82. History of EBSA and ERISA, U.S. Dep’t of Labor: Emp. Benefits Sec. 
Admin., https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/about-ebsa/about-us/history 
-of-ebsa-and-erisa [https://perma.cc/687X-KZ2G] (last visited Apr. 1, 
2021) (“Until February 2003, EBSA was known as the Pension and Welfare 
Benefits Administration (PWBA).”). 
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plan assets which are shares of corporate stock would include the 
voting of proxies appurtenant to those shares of stock.”83 This 
policy has been explicitly affirmed by the DOL in 1990,84 1994,85 
2008,86 2016,87 and 2018.88  
Such a policy presumes that significant, not de minimis, financial 
value will accrue to beneficiaries and participants if a plan 
manager, in accordance with [its] fiduciary duties, properly 
manages the shareholder voting rights associated with their plan’s 
equity holdings.89 
1. Shareholder Voting 
How shareholder voting is to be approached by a plan manager 
consistent with its fiduciary duties was summarized in footnote 4 of the 
Avon Letter: 
 
83. Avon Letter, supra note 81, at *2 (emphases added). 
84. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Pension & Welfare Benefit Admin., Opinion Letter on 
Responsibilities of Plan Fiduciaries under ERISA with Respect to Voting 
Proxies at *3 (Jan. 23, 1990) (“If either the plan or the investment 
management contract (in the absence of a specific plan provision) expressly 
precludes the investment manager from voting proxies, the responsibility 
for such proxy voting would be part of the trustees’ exclusive responsibility 
to manage and control the assets of the plan.”). 
85. Interpretive Bulletins Relating to the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974, 59 Fed. Reg. 38,863 (July 29, 1994) (to be codified at 
29 CFR pt. 2509) (“[A] statement of proxy voting policy would be an 
important part of any comprehensive statement of investment policy.”). 
86. Interpretive Bulletin Relating to Exercise of Shareholder Rights, 73 Fed. 
Reg. 61,731, 61,732 (Oct. 17, 2008) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2509) 
(“The fiduciary act of managing plan assets that are shares of corporate 
stock includes the management of voting rights appurtenant to those shares 
of stock.”). 
87. Interpretive Bulletin Relating to the Exercise of Shareholder Rights and 
Written Statements of Investment Policy, Including Proxy Voting Policies 
or Guidelines, 81 Fed. Reg. 95,879, 95,880 (Dec. 29, 2016) (to be codified 
at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2509) (“The Department’s longstanding position is that 
the fiduciary act of managing plan assets which are shares of corporate stock 
includes decisions on the voting of proxies . . . .”). 
88. Field Assistance Bulletin No. 2018-01, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Emp. 
Benefits Sec. Admin. (Apr. 23, 2018), https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ 
ebsa/employers-and-advisers/guidance/field-assistance-bulletins/2018-01 
[https://perma.cc/L9LB-2TPR]. 
89. Bernard S. Sharfman, Now Is the Time to Designate Proxy Advisors as 
Fiduciaries under ERISA, 25 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 1, 8 (2020). 
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Section 404(a)(1) requires, among other things, that a fiduciary 
of a plan act prudently, solely in the interest of the plan’s 
participants and beneficiaries, and for the exclusive purpose of 
providing benefits to participants and beneficiaries. To act 
prudently in the voting of proxies (as well as in all other fiduciary 
matters), a plan fiduciary must consider those factors which would 
affect the value of the plan’s investment. Similarly, the 
Department [of Labor] has construed the requirements that a 
fiduciary act solely in the interest of, and for the exclusive purpose 
of providing benefits to, participants and beneficiaries as 
prohibiting a fiduciary from subordinating the interests of 
participants and beneficiaries in their retirement income to 
unrelated objectives.90 
Accordingly, when a plan manager votes on behalf of an ERISA 
pension plan, it must do so within the strict and narrow boundaries of 
what the fiduciary duties of ERISA require. The DOL’s recently 
proposed rule, Fiduciary Duties Regarding Proxy Voting and 
Shareholder Rights, is very clear on the purpose of shareholder voting: 
“ERISA mandates that fiduciaries manage voting rights prudently and 
for the ‘exclusive purpose’ of securing economic benefits for plan 
participants and beneficiaries—which may or may not require a proxy 
vote to be cast.”91 
In the specific context of shareholder voting under the duty of 
prudence: 
[F]iduciaries must perform reasonable investigations, under–
standing that certain proposals may require a more detailed or 
particularized voting analysis. Information that will better enable 
fiduciaries to determine whether or how to vote proxies on 
particular matters includes the cost of voting, including 
opportunity costs; the type of proposal (e.g., those relating to 
social or public policy agendas versus those dealing with issues 
that have a direct economic impact on the investment); voting 
recommendations of management; and an analysis of the 
particular shareholder proponents. In the Department’s view, 
fiduciaries must be prepared to articulate the anticipated 
economic benefit of proxy-vote decisions in the event they decide 
to vote.92 
 
90. Avon Letter, supra note 81, at 11 n.4 (emphasis added). 
91. Fiduciary Duties Regarding Proxy Voting and Shareholder Rights, 85 Fed. 
Reg. 55,219, 55,223 (proposed Sept. 4, 2020) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. 
pt. 2509, 2550). 
92. Id. at 55, 224 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).  
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2. Shareholder Engagement 
DOL guidance on shareholder engagement is also clear and 
unambiguous. Not surprisingly, engagement is allowed as long as it 
resides within the confines of a plan manager’s fiduciary duties. 
According to the DOL’s recently proposed rule on shareholder voting, 
“ERISA does not permit fiduciaries, in voting proxies or exercising 
other shareholder rights, to subordinate the economic interests of 
participants and beneficiaries to unrelated objectives.”93 Moreover, the 
DOL “has rejected a construction of ERISA . . . that would permit plan 
fiduciaries to expend trust assets to promote myriad public policy 
preferences, including through shareholder engagement activities, voting 
proxies, or other investment policies.”94 
Moreover, the duty of prudence will require a reasonable investi–
gation into the costs and benefits of any engagement activity. This 
investigation must be done in order to conclude that there is “a 
reasonable expectation that such activities are likely to enhance the 
[economic] value of the plan’s investments after taking into account the 
costs.”95 
The key point is that a plan manager is allowed to engage with the 
management of a portfolio company but only if the engagement 
conforms to its fiduciary duties. This means that engagement must only 
be utilized if there is “a reasonable expectation that such activities are 
likely to enhance the [economic] value of the plan’s investments after 
taking into account the costs.”96 
IV. ERISA’s Fiduciary Duties and Index Funds: 
Issue and Rule 
In the Avon Letter, the DOL was discussing shareholder voting in 
the context of “the voting of proxies on plan-owned stock.”97 Back in 
1988, when the letter was written, the DOL was undoubtedly referring 
to the right to vote the proxies associated with the common stock of 
public companies held in portfolio. As the letter says: “In general, the 
fiduciary act of managing plan assets which are shares of corporate 
stock would include the voting of proxies appurtenant to those shares 
of stock.”98 
 
93. Id. at 55,220–21 (emphasis added).  
94. Id. at 55,221 (emphasis added).  
95. Field Assistance Bulletin No. 2018-01, supra note 88. 
96. Id. 
97. Avon Letter, supra note 81, at 1. 
98. Id. (emphasis added). 
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The direct ownership of corporate stock in ERISA plans is still 
significant. The DOL recently reported that ERISA plans hold in 
portfolio approximately $2.1 trillion of such stock.99 But over time, the 
nature of stock ownership has changed dramatically, as more and more 
plan assets are invested in mutual funds and ETFs.100 While the total 
dollar amount of equity index funds held in ERISA plans, either directly 
or through self-directed accounts, is not known, the Investment 
Company Institute has reported that 401K (ERISA) plans held over $2 
billion in mutual fund equities as of June 30, 2020.101 
A. The Issue 
As previously discussed, when a plan manager utilizes index mutual 
funds and/or ETFs for its portfolio or offers them as selections in self-
directed individual accounts, the plan has delegated away its voting 
authority to the investment advisers of those funds. This delegated 
voting authority does not come under the fiduciary duties of ERISA.102 
Therefore, given our focus on BlackRock, the issue becomes whether 
under the fact pattern of an ERISA plan investing in BlackRock’s index 
funds either directly or through self-directed accounts, does the plan 
manager have a fiduciary duty to investigate BlackRock’s shareholder 
activism?103 
B. The Rule 
Based on the rationales found in Section C of this Part, it is argued 
that a plan manager must do the following: A plan manager, when 
selecting [index] mutual funds and ETFs for direct ownership or 
availability to self-directed accounts and in the general monitoring of 
 
99. Fiduciary Duties Regarding Proxy Voting and Shareholder Rights, 85 Fed. 
Reg. 55,219, 55,228 (Sept. 4, 2020) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2509, 
2550). 
100. Id. at 55,222. 
101. Inv. Co. Inst., Report: The US Retirement Market, Second 
Quarter 2020 (Sept. 24, 2020), available at https://www.ici.org/info/ 
ret_20_q2_data.xls. 
102. See text accompanying notes 68–70. 
103. It is interesting to note that the DOL did not address this issue in its recent 
proposed rule on proxy voting, Fiduciary Duties Regarding Proxy Voting 
and Shareholder Rights. See supra note 91. This author believes that this 
was an important omission in the proposed rule. To correct this omission, 
this author in his comment letter to the DOL on this proposed rule asked 
the DOL to address this issue. See Letter from Bernard S. Sharfman to the 
Dep’t of Labor on Its Proposed Rule, Fiduciary Duties Regarding Proxy 
Voting and Shareholder Rights, https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/ 
EBSA/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regulations/public-comments/1210-
AB91/00057.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q7HN-N3KN]. 
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plan’s ongoing investment in these funds, has a fiduciary duty to 
investigate an investment adviser’s [BlackRock’s] shareholder activism.  
This rule is to apply to all index mutual funds and ETFs that an 
ERISA plan manager is considering to add, or has added, to its ERISA 
plan. However, for purposes of this Article, it will only be discussed in 
the context of the index funds that use BlackRock as its investment 
adviser. 
C. Rationales for the Rule 
Duty of Prudence Rationale: For a plan manager to adequately 
complete its financial analysis of a BlackRock index fund prior to 
making its investment decision, the investment adviser’s shareholder 
activism must be investigated for its potential to financially harm or 
benefit the plan. This activism is now an attribute of the investment 
that needs to be evaluated for purposes of making the investment 
decision.104 
Abdication Rationale: While the voting authority of an 
investment adviser to a mutual fund or ETF does not come under the 
fiduciary duties of ERISA, it is doubtful that the intent of the Avon 
Letter and all subsequent guidance in this regard was meant to absolve 
a plan manager of any fiduciary duty associated with the shareholder 
voting of shares that it now owns indirectly through its share ownership 
in mutual funds and ETFs. The result would be an abdication of duties 
in the context of shareholder voting. If a plan only invests in index 
funds and does not have direct holdings of voting stock, this would be 
a total abdication of duties. 
 
104. As a DOL advisory opinion stated:  
Section 3(21)(B) provides that a plan’s investment in a registered 
investment company “shall not by itself cause such investment 
company or such investment company’s investment adviser or 
principal underwriter to be deemed to be a fiduciary or a party in 
interest as those terms are defined in [Title I of ERISA], except 
insofar as such investment company or its investment adviser or 
principal underwriter acts in connection with an employee benefit 
plan covering employees of the investment company, the 
investment adviser, or its principal underwriter.”  
 U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Emp. Benefits Sec. Admin., Advisory Opinion 2009-
04a, at 1 (Dec. 4, 2009), https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/about-ebsa/ 
our-activities/resource-center/advisory-opinions/2009-04a [https://perma. 
cc/J7A9-3E64]. But “ERISA’s exclusion for mutual funds is not absolute. 
It does not apply to a plan fiduciary’s decision to invest plan assets in a 
mutual fund.” Id. at 2. 
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V. Applying the Rule to BlackRock’s 
Shareholder Activism 
The following investigates how BlackRock utilizes its shareholder 
activism. It focuses on BlackRock’s marketing objective, as identified 
in its rhetoric, and the stakeholder approach that underlies its engage–
ment strategy. 
A. BlackRock’s Shareholder Activism in a Theoretical Framework 
ERISA’s fiduciary duties require a plan manager to place a value 
on BlackRock’s shareholder activism so it can see how it impacts the 
overall financial value of an index fund investment. Such value is 
derived from its impact on the governance of the firms that are in the 
index. To understand how this value can be gauged, let’s consider the 
fiduciary duties of ERISA in the context of Goshen and Squire’s 
“principal-cost theory.”105 Under this theory, “each firm’s optimal 
governance structure minimizes total control costs, which are the sum 
of principal costs and agent costs.”106 According to Goshen and Squire, 
“Principal costs occur when investors exercise control (shareholders), 
and agent costs occur when managers exercise control.”107 These two 
category of costs are further sub-divided into “principal competence 
costs, principal conflict costs, agent competence costs, and agent 
conflict costs.”108 Competence costs are “the costs of honest mistakes 
and of efforts to avoid such mistakes, and conflict costs as the costs of 
self-seeking conduct and of efficient efforts to prevent such conduct.”109 
Most importantly, “[a] governance structure that maximizes firm value 
allocates control in the manner that minimizes the sum of costs across 
the four categories.”110 
ERISA’s fiduciary duties are neutral (without bias) to how the 
minimization of total control costs is achieved. A plan manager, as part 
of its investment analysis of investing in BlackRock’s index funds or 
allowing them to be used in self-directed accounts, would need to 
reasonably gauge the positive or negative value of shareholder activism 
at all the companies that make up the fund index. Such shareholder 
activism implicates the potential for increased principal competence or 
 
105. Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire, Principal Costs: A New Theory for 
Corporate Law and Governance, 117 Colum. L. Rev. 767, 770 (2017). 
106. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
107. Id. 
108. Id. at 784. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. 
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conflict costs while at the same time signaling the potential for reduced 
agent competence or conflict costs on a portfolio-wide basis. If this 
activism reduces total control costs on a portfolio basis, then it has 
value. If it increases total control costs on a portfolio basis, then it does 
financial harm. If the latter is significant, then the plan manager should 
seek out “reasonably available alternatives”111 that are not involved in 
such activism. If it does not, then it would be supporting, through the 
voting authority that it has delegated away to BlackRock, shareholder 
activism that is doing harm to the value of its investment. 
B. Marketing Objective 
We first look at the primary objective of BlackRock’s shareholder 
activism, the marketing of its investment products to millennials. From 
the perspective of BlackRock, the successful achievement of such a 
marketing objective would be a great financial win for the company and 
its own shareholders. It is no secret that the index-fund business, of 
which BlackRock is a leader, has become cutthroat and does not appear 
to be generating fees for anyone, including BlackRock. One way to 
increase fees is to convince investors, such as millennials, that the world 
would be a better place if they would just invest in ESG index funds. 
As previously discussed, the offering of ESG funds may be significantly 
more profitable for the investment adviser than lower-cost funds that 
use standardized indexes.112 
This marketing objective is definitely not consistent with a plan 
manager’s fiduciary duties. BlackRock’s voting and engagement 
behavior is being skewed in the direction of a particular subset of 
beneficial and potential beneficial investors, those who fit BlackRock’s 
marketing profile of a millennial, so as to enhance BlackRock’s own 
profitability. Moreover, this investor group is presumed not to be 
exclusively interested in the financial benefits their investments can 
provide. Therefore, the marketing to millennials is not being done 
“solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries” and for the 
“exclusive purpose” of providing financial benefits to beneficial 
investors such as participants and beneficiaries of an ERISA plan. 
From a theoretical perspective, BlackRock’s marketing objective 
definitely indicates an increase in principal conflict costs without any 
reduction in agent costs. Nevertheless, this marketing objective is not 
enough, on its own, for a plan manager to decline to consider the 
inclusion of BlackRock’s index funds into its plan’s portfolio. There is 
still no evidence how it would impact the financial benefits of a 
BlackRock index fund compared to “reasonably available alterna– 
111. Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments, 85 Fed. Reg. 72,846, 
72,848 (Nov. 13, 2020) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2509, 2550). 
112. See supra Part I.B. 
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tives.”113 Without such evidence, you cannot say that this marketing 
objective has created financial harm for its investors. 
C. Engagement Strategy and Stakeholder Approach 
As previously discussed, BlackRock has an engagement strategy 
that focuses on benefiting various stakeholders who most appeal to 
millennials. These stakeholders, at least for the time being, are those 
who have been impacted by climate change, gender equality, global 
supply chains and operations impacted by Covid-19, and racial 
equity.114 BlackRock has the ability and willingness to enforce this 
engagement strategy by threatening to vote against management on 
various management and shareholder proposals. Based on its recent 
shareholder voting record, it appears to do so mainly by voting against 
management’s nominees for board membership.115 
Clearly, this strategy is not being done “solely in the interest of the 
participants and beneficiaries” and for the “exclusive purpose” of 
providing financial benefits.116 As a result, this strategy has the 
potential for serious principal conflict costs. It is a red flag, suggesting 
that the plan manager would be better off seeking “reasonably available 
alternatives”117 that do not include this engagement strategy. 
1. A Harmful Engagement Strategy 
A strong argument can also be made that BlackRock’s engagement 
strategy of trying to influence the stakeholder relationships of its 
portfolio companies for purposes of marketing to millennials will result 
in financial harm to the beneficial investors of BlackRock’s index funds, 
including the participants and beneficiaries of ERISA plans. This is the 
result of stakeholder relationships being extremely complex, creating 
the need for constant management, and BlackRock’s investment 
stewardship team being extremely uninformed about these relation–
ships. 
a. The Complexity of Stakeholder Relationships 
As I have previously written: 
The management of [stakeholder] relationships is complex and is 
usually placed in the hands of those who have the knowledge and 
 
113. Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments, 85 Fed. Reg. at 72,848. 
114. See supra Part I. 
115. See supra Part II. 
116. Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments, 85 Fed. Reg. at 72,846, 
72,847. 
117. Id. at 72,848. 
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expertise to manage them: the company’s management team, up 
and down the line.118  
. . . . 
 . . . Moreover, [stakeholder] relationships can change on a daily 
basis: consumers who have ever-changing tastes or are becoming 
increasingly sensitive to the negative externalities that the 
company may create; competitors that introduce new products; 
changing technologies; threats to global and domestic supply 
chains for key components and raw materials; credit and equity 
markets that require ever-changing terms; and competitive labor 
markets for skilled talent. A failure to deal with these stakeholder 
relationship issues in an integrated manner can lead a company 
to report mediocre financial results and eventual failure.119 
The following quote by Emily Winston gets to the heart of how 
complex stakeholder relationships are and why it is very unusual for 
shareholders to be involved in their management: 
Public shareholders are not perfectly informed. Corporate 
managers have access to information about their firms to which 
public shareholders do not have access. Prominent in this 
category of private information is information about the 
corporation’s relationships with its non-shareholder stakeholders. 
Corporations’ relationships with their stakeholders are governed 
by agreements that are, to varying degrees, incomplete. At-will 
employees and customers, in particular, have very incomplete 
agreements with corporations, meaning most, if not all, terms of 
agreement are not explicitly specified. Even the more specific 
contracts, such as those with suppliers and creditors, will still 
have unspecified terms and will need to be negotiated repeatedly 
over the course of the corporation’s life. Stakeholder agreements 
are therefore the subject of ongoing negotiations between firm 
managers and the relevant stakeholders. Managing these 
relationships is the role of a corporate manager, and it exposes 
managers to vital information about those stakeholder relation–
ships to which shareholders are not privy. This information is not 
reducible to metrics that can be effectively transferred to 
shareholders, and public shareholders, by their nature, are not 
positioned, nor do they have the expertise, to be intimately 
 
118. Bernard S. Sharfman, Why BlackRock’s Stakeholder Approach Won’t 
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involved in the management of other stakeholder relationships. 
Thus, information asymmetries will prevent shareholders from 
being effective monitors of other stakeholder interests.120 
This understanding has led Professor Winston to conclude:  
Even when shareholders are financially incentivized to use their 
power to promote the interests of other stakeholders, they will 
lack the information about stakeholder relationships necessary to 
do so effectively. This asymmetry of information means that 
shareholders cannot incorporate stakeholder information into 
their assessment of firm value, so managing to shareholder 
expectations will not maximize the value created by stakeholder 
relationships.121  
In sum, “while corporate attention to non-shareholder stakeholders 
can improve firm value, shareholder oversight of these stakeholder 
relationships will not succeed in having this effect.”122 
b. An Extremely Uninformed Shareholder 
BlackRock gives all the indications of being an uninformed investor, 
even more so than the average shareholder. As previously mentioned, 
BlackRock’s investment stewardship team is only made up of forty-five 
professionals covering the globe, not just the U.S. markets.123 Of the 
twenty-two based in the U.S., twelve are focused globally while only 
ten are exclusively focused on North America.124 But being focused on 
North America means more than evaluating U.S. public companies, it 
also means Canada as well. For example, take this recent quote by a 
BlackRock analyst: “I cover industrials and materials in the US and 
Canada. I cover approximately 800 companies in those sectors and am 
responsible for the engagement and proxy voting with those firms.”125 
When compared to an equity analyst who covers only five to fifteen 
companies at a time,126 this is an astonishing number of companies to 
cover on an annual basis. It is not hard to conclude that it is not 
 
120. Emily Winston, Managerial Fixation and the Limitations of Shareholder 
Oversight, 71 Hastings L.J. 699, 705 (2020) (emphases added). 
121. Id. at 699. 
122. Id. 
123. Investment Stewardship Annual Report, supra note 18. 
124. See id. 
125. Ben Ashwell, How BlackRock Connects the Dots on ESG, Corp. Sec’y (Oct. 
12, 2020), https://www.corporatesecretary.com/articles/esg/32296/how-
blackrock-connects-dots-esg [https://perma.cc/Q5ZE-DJN5]. 
126. Griffith, supra note 73, at 1001. 
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possible for an analyst covering so many companies to become informed 
about any one of them. 
Moreover, BlackRock and the other members of the Big Three are 
in the worst possible position for becoming informed and getting 
involved in the management of a public company’s stakeholder 
relationships. According to law professor Charles Korsmo: 
A large and growing share of institutional investment is in the 
form of “passive” index funds. . . . They seek to offer a market 
return and compete by offering the lowest possible fees to 
individual investors. As a result, they expend little or no effort 
seeking to value the firms they invest in. While these index funds 
are certainly “sophisticated” investors in the sense that they 
understand the central lesson of modern portfolio theory [(that it 
is more efficient to have a properly diversified investment 
portfolio than to try to pick stock winners using only publicly 
available information)] . . . they are not “sophisticated” in the 
sense of knowing anything about the firms they invest in. The 
whole philosophy of index investing is that it is unnecessary to 
know anything about the firms you invest in.127 
According to Bebchuk and Hirst, when investment stewardship 
teams from the Big Three engage with their portfolio companies, they 
show zero interest in financial underperformance: “We reviewed all of 
the examples of behind-the-scenes engagements described in the Big 
Three Stewardship Reports. We found zero cases where engagement 
was described as being motivated by financial underperformance.”128 In 
the specific case of BlackRock’s investment stewardship team, given the 
extremely limited resources it has to work with, why should we expect 
anything more? 
Think about this in terms of BlackRock’s recent focus on global 
supply chains and how the coronavirus exposed their weaknesses.129 
Where does BlackRock’s expertise come from when it weighs in on how 
supply chains need to be restructured? This type of inquiry may sound 
good to millennials who would like to see supply chains and their 
associated job offerings become more domestic, and therefore make 
more jobs available to them, but with BlackRock being uninformed and 
not focused on the financial performance of its portfolio companies, one 
must conclude that BlackRock’s investment stewardship team will not 
be able to add anything of real value to this kind of decision-making. 
 
127. Charles R. Korsmo, Delaware’s Retreat from Judicial Scrutiny of Mergers, 
10 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 55, 99 (2019) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
128. Bebchuk & Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance: 
Theory, Evidence, and Policy, supra note 15, at 2096 (emphasis added). 
129. BlackRock Investment Stewardship Global Quarterly Stewardship Report, 
supra note 46, at 3.  
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Finally, it must be noted that BlackRock’s investment stewardship 
team may actually reduce firm value if its shareholder activism is 
successful. If BlackRock tries to pressure a company to make changes 
to its stakeholder relationships that management knows are value-
reducing, management may counter-propose and agree to a less 
suboptimal, non-wealth-maximizing alternative in order to avoid the 
uncertain outcome of BlackRock going public with its concerns. This is 
an argument similar to the one made by John Matsusaka and Oguzhan 
Ozbas in a recent paper on shareholder proposals submitted by 
activists: 
Managers have an incentive to deter proposals from activist 
shareholders by adjusting corporate policy; one might conjecture 
that external pressure leads them to choose policies more 
appealing to other shareholders in order to reduce the electoral 
prospects of activist proposals. However, we show that when 
deterrence occurs, it is always by moving policy toward the 
position favored by the activist, even if this reduces shareholder 
wealth. Our analysis stresses the central role of voting uncertainty 
in determining the value consequences of shareholder rights and 
proxy access.130 
The recent work of Nickolay Gantchev and Mariassunta Giannetti 
supports the idea that corporate boards would simply be acting 
rationally to reduce uncertainty if they were to privately agree to a less 
wealth-reducing alternative. Gantchev and Giannetti found that value-
destroying shareholder proposals, typically submitted by high-volume 
submitters of proposals, may actually go to a vote, receive majority 
support, and be implemented by management.131 Therefore, the risk 
that management may have to fully implement BlackRock’s unin–
formed recommendations, if BlackRock were to go public and receive 
support from other uninformed and opportunistic shareholders, may 
lead them to privately agree to less harmful arrangements. 
2. Summary of BlackRock’s Engagement Strategy 
BlackRock’s engagement strategy is arguably not appropriate for 
enhancing the financial benefits of its beneficial investors, including 
those who are ERISA plan participants and beneficiaries. This strategy 
exhibits significant principal conflict and competency costs. If 
BlackRock’s investment stewardship team were truly interested in 
 
130. John G. Matsusaka & Oguzhan Ozbas, A Theory of Shareholder Approval 
and Proposal Rights, 33 J. L. Econ. & Org. 377, 377 (2017) (emphasis 
added). 
131. Nickolay Gantchev & Mariassunta Giannetti, The Costs and Benefits of 
Shareholder Democracy 2 (Oct. 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (http:// 
ssrn.com/abstract_id=3269378).  
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enhancing the financial benefits provided to ERISA plan participants 
and beneficiaries, it is extremely doubtful that it would do so by 
becoming a third-party monitor and manager of its portfolio companies’ 
stakeholder relationships. Therefore, a plan manager, after investigating 
BlackRock’s engagement strategy, could reasonably conclude that it is 
financially harmful to its plan and decide to seek out “reasonably 
available alternatives”132 that are not associated with such an 
engagement strategy. 
D. Under ERISA, What Kind of Shareholder Activism and   
Engagement Strategy Adds Value? 
Under ERISA, the sole and exclusive focus of a plan manager is to 
protect and enhance the financial benefits of a plan’s participants and 
beneficiaries.133 This objective limits the types of shareholder activism 
and engagement strategies that would be looked upon with favor by a 
plan manager. And it appears that hedge fund activism meets this 
criteria. 
Hedge fund activism begins with an unregulated investment fund 
investing significant resources to identify an underperforming public 
company that may financially benefit from a significant change in 
business strategy.134 In this identification process, the hedge fund 
becomes very informed about the target company. Once that company 
is identified and found acceptable for activism, the hedge fund devotes 
a significant amount of funds in the accumulation of the target 
company’s stock, usually around five to ten percent of the shares 
outstanding.135 (Of course, given that a member of the Big Three 
already owns around five to ten percent of the voting stock of many 
U.S. public companies,136 the accumulation of a company’s outstanding 
stock would not likely be an issue.) According to Rose and Sharfman, 
“[t]he catalyst for the accumulation is a determination by the hedge 
fund that the target company is currently not maximizing returns, but 
that if management would implement the hedge fund’s recommended 
 
132. Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments, 85 Fed. Reg. 72,846, 72,848 
(Nov. 13, 2020) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2509, 2550). 
133. Id. 
134. Bernard S. Sharfman, A Theory of Shareholder Activism and its Place in 
Corporate Law, 82 Tenn. L. Rev. 791, 806 (2015) [hereinafter Sharfman, 
Shareholder Activism]. 
135. Id. at 809. 
136. Bebchuk & Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance: 
Theory, Evidence, and Policy, supra note 15, at 2033. 
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changes, company performance would improve, the stock would 
increase in value, and the hedge fund would reap excess returns.”137 
The hedge fund activist then invests more resources into its 
engagement strategy.138 The strategy begins with a private meeting with 
the target’s board of directors and executive management.139 Then, if 
necessary, it goes public with its recommended changes to increase the 
price of the target’s stock.140 It can incorporate several hostile 
components such as “a threatened or actual proxy contest, takeover, 
lawsuit, or public campaign that is openly confrontational.”141 
In sum, the hedge fund activist has an expectation that if the target 
company “would change its strategies to what the hedge fund believes 
is correct, then company performance will improve, the stock will 
increase in value, and the hedge fund will earn excess returns on its 
investment.”142 Its engagement strategy reveals itself in the advocacy 
that the hedge fund uses to persuade the target company to implement 
the strategic changes (private versus public, hostile or not) that it 
believes will significantly increase the target’s stock price. Extensive 
empirical evidence has confirmed that this type of activism has, on 
average, been wealth enhancing for investors.143 Based on this empirical 
evidence, it can be argued that what has occurred is that not only is 
there a reduction in principal competency costs, as reflected in the 
informed nature of the hedge fund activist as shareholder, but also a 
reduction in agent competency costs given that the information is 
willingly received and absorbed by management. 
 
137. Paul Rose & Bernard S. Sharfman, Shareholder Activism as a Corrective 
Mechanism in Corporate Governance, 2014 BYU L. Rev. 1015, 1034 
(2014). 
138. Sharfman, Shareholder Activism, supra note 134, at 809. 
139. Id. 
140. Id. 
141. Alon Brav, Wei Jang, Frank Partnoy & Randall Thomas, Hedge Fund 
Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, 63 J. Finance 
1729, 1732 (2008). 
142. Sharfman, Shareholder Activism, supra note 134, at 806. 
143. Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav & Wei Jiang, The Long-Term Effects of 
Hedge Fund Activism, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 1085, 1085 (2015); Brav et al., 
supra note 141, at 1731; Nicole M. Boyson & Robert M. Mooradian, 
Corporate Governance and Hedge Fund Activism, 14 Rev. Derivatives 
Rsch. 169, 175–78, 201 (2011); Christopher P. Clifford, Value Creation or 
Destruction? Hedge Funds as Shareholder Activists, 14 J. Corp. Fin. 323, 
324 (2008); Robin M. Greenwood & Michael Schor, Investor Activism and 
Takeovers, 92 J. Fin. Econ. 362, 374 (2009); April Klein & Emanuel Zur, 
Entrepreneurial Shareholder Activism: Hedge Funds and Other Private 
Investors, 64 J. Fin. 187, 213, 217–18 (2009). 
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It is possible that BlackRock or another Big Three member may 
consider taking up an engagement strategy that mimics what a hedge 
fund activist would use. Interestingly, this would make Bebchuk and 
Hirst quite happy, as they basically have advocated for the Big Three 
to invest the resources necessary for them to act like super huge hedge 
fund activists.144 However, this would require a total change of a Big 
Three’s business model, i.e., moving from making minimal investments 
in being informed to one where huge amounts of resources are being 
expended toward becoming informed about the portfolio companies 
they manage and then investing even further in becoming effective in 
advocating for strategic change at those companies. This change does 
not seem likely, but it would be consistent with ERISA’s fiduciary 
duties. 
Conclusion 
An ERISA plan manager cannot simply delegate away its fiduciary 
duties when delegating its shareholder voting authority to BlackRock. 
The plan manager’s duty of prudence requires it to investigate 
BlackRock’s shareholder activism to see what financial impact it will 
have on its participants and beneficiaries. 
This Article argues that after an appropriate investigation, a plan 
manager may find that BlackRock’s engagement strategy is not 
consistent with its fiduciary duties. Therefore, a plan manager may 
decide to seek out reasonably available index fund alternatives that are 
not associated with such a strategy. For the BlackRock funds to become 
more desirable for inclusion in a plan’s investment portfolio or be used 
in self-directed accounts, it would appear that BlackRock could create 
a firewall between funds that are to be included in ERISA plans and 
those that are not. The former would somehow not be associated with 
the current engagement strategy implemented by its investment stew–
ardship team. Or, BlackRock could simply shut down its engagement 
strategy until it could implement a strategy of shareholder activism, 
such as the hedge fund approach proposed by Bebchuk and Hirst, that 
would not be expected to have a negative financial impact. 
While the focus of this Article is on BlackRock’s delegated voting 
authority and associated shareholder activism, it is meant to apply to 
any and all investment advisers who attempt to leverage their delegated 
voting authority for purposes of engaging in such activism. Moreover, 
the DOL should provide guidance to plan managers on when the 
investment products of investment advisers with delegated voting 
authority need to be excluded. 
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